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1 Introduction
All industrialized countries except Australia have an eco-label scheme
in place, while no country in Africa and only Brazil in Latin-America
has got an eco-label scheme [5]. Eco-labels has received considerable at-
tention in the WTO, and is one of the more controversial aspects of the
trade-environment debate. The criteria for obtaining an eco-label are of-
ten based on non-product-related process and production methods, and
the labels are therefore criticized for imposing the environmental con-
cerns of importing countries on the production methods of their trading
partners. However, to our knowledge, the trade and welfare eﬀects of
voluntary eco-label schemes which include prescriptions for process- and
production methods is never analyzed before in a formal model.
A typical eco-label scheme lists a set of environmentally related cri-
teria for each product category, and awards the eco-label to the products
that fulfill the criteria. The same eco-label is often used for a wide range
of diﬀerent product categories. Firms decide themselves whether they
will adjust their products and/or methods of production, and can con-
tinue to market their products even though the products do not have
the eco-label.
Most eco-label schemes are put in place on an initiative from a gov-
ernmental body, examples are the EU eco-label, the U.S. EPA Energy
Star and the Nordic Swan. For the time being they are also dependent
of governmental funding - the Nordic Swan receiving about half of its
budget from the Nordic governments[12]. Thus, eco-label schemes must
be regarded as a part of a government’s environmental policy.
It is evident that eco-label schemes frequently include prescriptions
regarding process- and production methods. One example is the EU eco-
label criteria for copying paper which includes only prescriptions related
to the production of the paper, that is, demand for sustainable forest
management, chlorine free bleaching and maximum limits for polluting
discharges per ton paper produced [6].
With respect to national firms or EU firms the same environmental
targets could be reached by introducing environmental minimum stan-
dards. Hence, we ask why countries include production related environ-
mental standards in voluntary eco-label schemes instead of regulating
their firms directly. Among others the WTO seems to have the view
that eco-labels partly serve protectionist purposes, and that environ-
mental minimum standards which only aﬀect the local producers should
be the preferred instrument. Thus, we also question whether eco-labels
based on production and/or process related criteria are likely to hurt
exporting countries and to reduce global welfare.
The paper provides a theoretical analysis of these questions. In a
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simple model with international trade we compare eco-labels with en-
vironmental minimum standards. We find that eco-labels only have a
rationale as long as consumers prefer to buy eco-labeled products re-
gardless of the product being produced at home or abroad. Eco-labels
may then be preferable to environmental standards because they provide
governments with an opportunity to regulate pollution outside their ju-
risdiction.
Further, we find that eco-labels may, under some circumstances, in-
crease both the welfare of the importing country and the welfare of the
exporting country. The reason is that eco-labels makes it possible for
the exporting firm to commit to more stringent environmental regulation
whenever this is profitable. Hence, in the case treated in the paper the
product category is not included in the eco-label scheme of protectionist
purposes, but to satisfy the demand in the importing country for global
environmental quality.
The analysis also contains some other potentially interesting insights.
It is argued in the so called Porter-hypothesis that more stringent en-
vironmental regulation will enhance the competitiveness of firms [13].
This paper suggests that this can happen if consumers demand green
products, but have no means to check whether a product is really pro-
duced in an environmentally friendly way. The environmental quality of
a product is a sort of credence good, that is, a good for which the quality
can neither be observed before purchase nor experienced by use. Hence,
if consumers do not trust firms to incur extra costs in order to produce
in an environmentally friendly way, firms may be unable to supply green
products when left to themselves.
In our model there are just two countries and two firms: One for-
eign firm which exports to a domestic market, and competes with one
domestic firm. Production of the products implies emissions to the local
environment in both countries, but only the domestic consumers have
preferences for a better environment1. Further, they are willing to pay
more for less polluting products. However, according to the GATT rules,
the domestic government can not tax or deny imports of foreign products
that are produced in a way which does not follow the national, environ-
mental minimum standard. An environmental standard will therefore
only apply to the domestic firm.
In order to compare the welfare eﬀects of eco-labels and environ-
mental standards, we need a model where firms initially make positive
profit, that is, before any environmental policy is introduced. Our point
1An example of such preferences could be the preferences of American consumers
for the well being of dolphins both inside and outside the economic zone of the U.S.
See Teisl, Roe & Hicks (2001) on the tuna-safe labeling in the U.S.
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of departure is therefore that the domestic market is historically diﬀeren-
tiated along some horizontal, taste dimension. Although consumers are
willing to pay more for less polluting products, they likely diﬀer in how
much more they are willing to pay. Hence, the environmental perfor-
mance of products can be used to diﬀerentiate products along a vertical,
quality dimension. This implies that the market may be diﬀerentiated
along both one horizontal dimension and one vertical dimension as in
the model of Neven and Thisse [11].
Oligopoly models with vertical diﬀerentiation, see for example the
one introduced by Shaked and Sutton [15], have been used frequently to
analyze markets with demand for green products. Arora and Gangopadhyay[2]
study over-compliance with respect to minimum environmental stan-
dards in a vertical diﬀerentiation model. Further, Cremer and Thisse[4]
use a similar vertical diﬀerentiation model to analyze how an environ-
mental subsidy interacts with firms environmental quality decisions.
In both papers it is assumed that consumers know the environmental
records of firms, and there is no analysis of eco-labels.
Motta and Thisse[10] use the vertical diﬀerentiation model to look at
trade eﬀects when there is demand for green products. However, unlike
this paper, they focus on product related pollution externalities, and they
do not include eco-labels. Eco-labels have no role to play in their model
since it is assumed, as in Arora and Gangopadhyay[2] and in Cremer
and Thisse[4], that consumers know the environmental performance of
diﬀerent products.
The model with diﬀerentiation in two dimensions diﬀers from the
pure vertical diﬀerentiation model of Motta and Thisse[10], Arora and
Gangopadhyay[2] and Cremer and Thisse [4] in many ways. They all typ-
ically find that firms will supply diﬀerent levels of environmental quality
in equilibrium. On the contrary, with diﬀerentiation in two dimensions,
the equilibrium may be that both firms supply high environmental qual-
ity. Further, unlike the pure vertical diﬀerentiation model, firms make
positive profit initially, and when they supply the same level of environ-
mental quality.
Clearly, getting information about and verifying the environmental
performance of products can be diﬃcult. This is even more likely to
be the case if pollution are related to the production of the product,
and production takes place far away from consumption. In the paper we
assume that only the domestic government can inform the domestic con-
sumers about the environmental performance of products. Thus, firms
are not willing to supply ”greener products” when left to themselves.
A similar case is also treated in Rege[14]. In her model consumers
are willing to pay more for ”greener products”, however, they do not
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know whether firms cheat, that is, claims to produce with a clean tech-
nology while actually producing with a dirty technology. This leads to
a too low adoption of the clean technology - possibly no adoption at all.
Further, by setting an environmental standard, or oﬀering an eco-label,
the government can help firms committing to cleaner production.
Since the purchase of one single consumer virtually has no eﬀect on
the state of the environment, the consumer motivation behind green
demand also needs to be explained. The type of consumer behavior in
question is a sort of voluntary contribution to a public good, that is, the
global environment. According to Andreoni[1] voluntary contributions
to a public good can be explained by what he coins impure altruism. In
this case the consumer gets utility from both giving (referred to as warm
glow by Andreoni[1]) and from the public good in question. The act of
choosing a green product can give the consumer a quiet conscience, is a
simple way to express a political opinion, may help building an identity
as a responsible citizen, and all this may well yield extra satisfaction
independent of the resulting eﬀect on the environment.
2 The model
The model consists of a three-stage game of perfect information among
the domestic government and two firms, one domestic and one foreign.
At Stage 1, the domestic government chooses whether it will regulate
pollution with a national environmental standard or include the prod-
uct category in an eco-label scheme. Further, it decides the level of
environmental regulation, that is, either the strength of the environ-
mental standard, r¯s, or the strength of the eco-label criterium for the
new product category, r¯c. At Stage 2, firms decide whether to adopt the
eco-label if an eco-label is oﬀered. Lastly, in Stage 3, firms compete in
prices on the domestic country market.
2.1 Consumers
Consumers are uniformly distributed over a unit square. The domestic
firm is located at (0, 0), whereas the foreign firm is located at (1, 0), that
is, at each end of the bottom line in the unit square. Let x ∈ [0, 1]. Then
x is the number of consumers in the interval [0, x].
Each consumer wants only one unit of the good, and would in gen-
eral like the product to be produced in an ”environmentally friendly”
way. However, by assumption, she can only be sure that environmen-
tally friendly production takes place if the producer is regulated by an
environmental standard set by the domestic government, or if she can
observe an eco-label issued by the domestic government.
The utility of consumer x from consuming one unit of the domestic
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product at (0, 0) is:
U0x =



s− tx2 + λxm(r¯s) if environmental standard
s− tx2 + λxm(r¯c) if adoption of eco-label
s− tx2 if no regulation
, (1)
and respectively, from the foreign product at (1, 0):
U1x =



s− t [1− x]2 if environmental standard
s− t [1− x]2 + λxm(r¯c) if adoption of eco-label
s− t [1− x]2 if no regulation
(2)
(where s is the exogenously given gross utility)
The parameter t expresses the strength of personal tastes, often
coined the transportation cost parameter, while x, alternatively [1− x],
measures how far the consumer is from her ideal product in the horizon-
tal dimension, that is, along the bottom line of the unit square. The t
parameter can be normalized to 1 without loss of generality.
The term, λxm(r¯j), j = s, c, is the consumer’s personal benefit of con-
tributing to the environment, also called the warm glow eﬀect. In par-
ticular, we assume that m is continuously diﬀerentiable, and m(0) = 0,
m ≥ 0, m < 0, that is, the higher the level of environmental regulation,
the higher the warm glow eﬀect. The parameter λx reflects consumer
heterogeneity, and is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
Demand will also depend on the relative strength of the two diﬀer-
entiation dimensions, or as Neven and Thisse coin it, whether demand
is horizontally or vertically dominated. Horizontal domination implies
that the taste parameter is relatively more important for the consumer
than the environmental performance of the product, and obtains when
m(r¯c) ≤ 2t . While vertical domination can be interpreted as the op-
posite case, that is, environmental quality is relatively more important
than taste, which obtains when m(r¯c) > 2t (Neven and Thisse [11]).
2.2 Firms
Emissions, ei, i = d, f , are assumed to be proportional to output, qi,
i = d, f (domestic/foreign), and can be abated at a cost. Further, let
(1− ri), ri ∈ [0, 1], i = d, f , denote the emission/output ratio chosen by
the domestic and foreign firm, respectively. Global emissions can then
be written:
e = ed + ef
= [1− rd] qd + [1− rf ] qf . (3)
We assume that abatement of emissions increases both total and
marginal cost of production, that is, the more the firm produce, the
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more must be abated both totally and at the margin. Hence, for the
firms’ cost function we have;
ς(qi, ri) = [c0 + c(ri)] qi, i = d, f (4)
where the function,c, is continuously diﬀerentiable, and c(0) = 0, c > 0
and c > 0. We also assume m(0) > c(0) in order to ensure an interior
solution.
Finally, the profit of the firms are given by:
πi(pd, pf ) = [pi − c0 − c(ri)] qi(pd, pf), i = d, f,
where pi is the price of product i, i = d, f , and qi(pd, pf) is domestic
demand for product i, i = d, f .
Assuming an interior solution to the market game in which the whole
market is covered, we have for the levels of output, qd + qf = 1.
2.3 The domestic government
The domestic government maximizes domestic welfare which consists of
domestic consumer surplus, CS, domestic profit and the global level of
environmental damage:
w = CS + πd − δe (5)
The level of environmental damage is given from an environmental
damage function, δe, which reflects that the domestic consumers care
for both the domestic and foreign level of pollution. The individual
consumer can not directly influence the environmental cost because she
is only one of many consumers, and hence, her choice will only have
a marginal eﬀect on total environmental cost. Note also that, when
rd = rf = 0, we have δe = δ. Hence, the parameter, δ, directly reflects
the seriousness of the environmental problem.
Consumer surplus is the total gross utility from buying plus the ag-
gregated warm glow eﬀect; WG, less the transfer of wealth from con-
sumers to firms and the aggregated transport cost; TC:
CS = s+WG− pdqd − pfqf − TC. (6)
The transport cost can be thought of as the disutility incurred by each
consumer having to consume one of the two products placed at either
end of the bottom line of the unit square, instead of somewhere closer
to the consumer. Further, due to the assumption of impure altruism,
the benefit of environmental regulation consists of both the warm glow
eﬀect and the reduced environmental cost.
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Inserting (6) into (5), we get the following expression for domestic
welfare:
w = s+WG− pdqd − pfqf − TC + πd − δe, (7)
Note that all terms in (7), apart from the total gross utility from
buying, s, will depend on the policy of the government.
3 Environmental standard
Let m(r) ≤ 2, ∀r ∈ [0, 1] implying that demand is horizontally domi-
nated. Consider now the case in which the domestic government sets an
environmental standard, r¯s. For the domestic and foreign firm’s emis-
sion/output ratio this implies that (1−rd) = (1− r¯s), while (1−rf) = 1,
respectively (see Appendix).
3.1 The market game
The marginal consumer, x∗, who is just indiﬀerent between buying from
firm d and f , is found by solving the following equation for λ∗x:
s+ λ∗xm(r¯s)− [x∗]
2 − pd = s− [1− x∗]2 − pf
⇔
λ∗x =
2
m(r¯s)

x∗ +
pd − pf − 1
2

, r¯s > 0. (8)
Consumers are uniformly distributed over a unit square, and equation
(8) describes a straight line with steepness 2
m(r¯s)
which divides the unit
square into the market shares of Firm d and Firm f , respectively. Figure
1 shows an example:
Figure 1
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x
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Consumers putting much weight on the environment, that is, having
a high λ, will tend to buy from the domestic producer placed at 0 even
though they are closer on the line to the product placed at 1.
Whenever the products are diﬀerentiated along both environmental
performance and taste, demand functions; qi(pd, pf), i = d, f , are com-
posed of three segments. It can be shown that at each kink demand is
continuous. Given the domain of the functions, m(r) and c(r), r ∈ [0, 1],
see Figure 2 below and the Appendix, the unique Bertrand-Nash equilib-
rium can be found on the intermediate segment of the demand function.
From the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium we can derive the equilibrium out-
puts and profits:
πd = 2 [qd]
2 = 2

6− 2c(r¯s) +m(r¯s)
12
2
(9)
and:
πf = 2 [qf ]
2 = 2

6 + 2c(r¯s)−m(r¯s)
12
2
(10)
where we have used the fact that rd = r¯s, and rf = 0. Note that output
and profit when r¯s = 0 is equal to, 12 , for both firms.
From the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, we can also find the reduced
form expressions for the aggregated transport cost and the aggregated
warm glow eﬀect:
TChds =
1 + [m(r¯s)]
2 + [c(r¯s)]
2 −m(r¯s)c(r¯s)
12
(11)
WGhds =
m(r¯s)
4

1 +
m(r¯s)− c(r¯s)
3

(12)
Note that transport costs are minimized when r¯s = 0. The intuition
is that consumers placed close to the foreign product with respect to
their tastes may buy the domestic product for environmental reasons
when r¯s > 0, see Figure 1 above.
Further, note that the aggregated warm glow eﬀect is decreasing in
c. The intuition is that a higher c, implies a lower market share for the
domestic firm, and hence, a lower aggregated warm glow eﬀect.2
3.2 Optimal policy
The domestic government maximizes welfare with respect to r¯s. The
domestic government has three kinds of strategic incentives: 1) keep
2The complete derivation of the demand functions, the Nash-price equilibrium,
the equilibrium outputs and profits, the transport cost and the warm glow eﬀect are
shown in the Appendix.
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products similar in the vertical dimension to reduce transport costs, 2)
keep foreign output and price down to minimize the wealth shift from
domestic consumers to the foreign firm and 3) shift production to the
domestic producer which is regulated, in order to increase the warm glow
eﬀect and to reduce the global level of environmental damage.
Define the constant, s¯ = s − c0 − δ − 712 . Inserting into the welfare
expression (7), from the emission function (3) when rd = r¯s and rf = 0,
and further, inserting from (9), (10), (11), and (12), we get
ws(r¯s) = s¯−
[m(r¯s)]
2 + [c(r¯s)]
2 −m(r¯s)c(r¯s)
36
(13)
+
5
6

m(r¯s)
2
− c(r¯s)

+ δr¯sqd(r¯s).
Denote the environmental standard which maximizes (13), r¯∗s . As-
sume that the second-order condition for a welfare maximum holds i.e.
∂2ws(r¯s)
(∂r¯s)2
. Further, assume that ∂r¯
∗
s
∂δ > 0, that is the stringency of the envi-
ronmental standard is increasing in the seriousness of the environmental
damage.
We then make the following observation (see Proof in the Appendix):
If δ = 0, then
m(r¯∗s)
2
> c(r¯∗s).
Hence, there must exist an interval:

0, δ¯

, such that for δ ∈

0, δ¯

,
we have m(r¯
∗
s )
2
≥ c(r¯∗s). We then have the following corollary:
Corollary 1 If δ ∈

0, δ¯

, domestic profit will increase from the envi-
ronmental standard.
Proof. The result can be seen directly from (9) and (10).
The intuition is straight-forward. If the warm glow eﬀect is large
relative to the cost of abatement, the average willingness to pay for
”green products” will be suﬃcient to cover the optimal level of the per
unit abatement cost. By setting an environmental standard, and making
the standard known, the government makes the consumer value of the
domestic product increase.
4 Eco-label scheme
Instead of setting an environmental standard, the government may in-
clude the product category in an eco-label scheme and set a criterium,
r¯c. This allows the foreign firm to voluntarily choose to be regulated by
the eco-label scheme criterium, r¯c, which will imply: rf = r¯c.
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4.1 The market game
In case only the domestic firm has adopted the eco-label, the profit of
the two firms is described by (9) and (10), that is, an eco-label scheme
is identical to an environmental standard. This holds also for the case
in which only the foreign firm has adopted the eco-label; however, it is
then as if the foreign firm were regulated by an environmental standard,
and not the domestic firm.
In case both firms have adopted the eco-label, the model ”collapses”
to the Hotelling model with only horizontal diﬀerentiation. This implies
that both firms charge a constant mark-up on their marginal cost, and
earn profit, πd = πf = 12 , independent of the size of the marginal cost
(see Appendix).
4.2 Adopting the eco-label
Our tie-breaking rule is that in order for a firm to adopt the eco-label,
its profit should not decrease. We then look for Nash-equilibria in the
second stage of the game when the firms must choose between the pure
strategies ”adopt” or ”not adopt”. There is a unique equilibrium in this
stage of the game. Depending on the values on the functions m(r¯c) and
c(r¯c), the equilibrium is either that both firms adopt the eco-label, or
that none of the firms adopt the eco-label.
This can be seen directly from the profit expressions (9) and (10).
Given that the foreign firm does not adopt the eco-label, the domestic
firm adopts the eco-label if
1
2

6− 2c(r¯c) +m(r¯c)
6
2
≥ 1
2
, (14)
and given that the foreign firm adopts the eco-label, the domestic firm
also adopts the eco-label if:
1
2

6 + 2c(r¯c)−m(r¯c)
6
2
≤ 1
2
, (15)
Note that both condition (15) and condition (14) can be reduced
to; m(r¯c)
2
≥ c(r¯c). Hence, as long as m(r¯c)2 ≥ c(r¯c) the strategy ”adopt”
strictly dominates the strategy ”not adopt” for the domestic firm. Since
firms are symmetric, this must hold also for the foreign firm.
When m(r¯c)
2
< c(r¯c), ”not adopt” strictly dominates ”adopt” for both
firms. Thus, in order to get adoption of the eco-label the average will-
ingness to pay for the eco-label has to be equal to or greater than the
per unit abatement cost.
Figure 2 shows the relevant ranges for m(r) and c(r):
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Figure 2
B
A
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
c(r)
0.5 1 1.5 2
m(r)
Area A + B constitute the domain of the model in the case of hori-
zontal domination. That is, we restrict attention to types of functions,
m(r) and c(r), r ∈ [0, 1], which map into the set which consists of Area
A and Area B. The unique Bertrand-Nash equilibrium will then be on
the intermediate segment of the demand function. Further, in Area B
both firms will adopt the eco-label, while in Area A no firm will adopt
the eco-label.
4.3 Optimal policy
In case both firms adopt the eco-label, we have for the aggregated trans-
port cost and the aggregated warm glow eﬀect:
TCc =
1
12
, (16)
WGc =
m(r¯c)
2
. (17)
(see Appendix)
Clearly, it is of no point to the domestic government to include the
product category into an eco-label scheme, if no firm is going to the
adopt the eco-label. Hence, for
m(r¯c)
2
≥ c(r¯c),
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welfare in the eco-label scheme case is given by:
wc(r¯c) = s¯ +
m(r¯c)
2
− c(r¯c) + δr¯c, (18)
where s¯ = s − δ − c0 − 712 as before. And where we have inserted,
πd = πf = 12 , the emission function (3) when rd = rf = r¯c, further, (16)
and (17) into the welfare function (7).
Denote the eco-label scheme criteria which maximizes (18), r¯∗c . Note
that m(r¯
∗
c )
2
≥ c(r¯∗c) must hold.
5 The full game
Comparing the welfare in the two cases analyzed above, we obtain:
Proposition 2 If δ ∈

0, δ¯

, the sub-game perfect equilibrium in the
game must have the following properties:
• The government chooses to introduce an eco-label, and set the cri-
terium; r¯c = r¯∗c .
• Both firms adopt the eco-label.
Proof. As long as m(r¯
∗
s )
2
≥ c(r¯∗s), the government can set r¯c = r¯∗s , and
get both firms to adopt the eco-label. Then by comparing (13) with (18)
when r¯c = r¯s = r¯∗s , we see from the welfare-expressions that welfare in
the eco-label case is higher than welfare in the environmental standard
case (remember that qd(r¯s) < 1).
Domestic welfare is maximized with an eco-label. This holds even
though domestic profit would be higher with a corresponding environ-
mental standard. The intuition is that the environmental benefit in-
creases discontinuously when the foreign firm adopts the eco-label. Fur-
ther, we also have a positive eﬀect on welfare from the reduced transport
cost.
We may also have situations in which the level of environmental
damage is large, but in which it is still optimal to introduce an eco-label.
For this second characterization of the sub-game perfect equilibrium we
have:
Proposition 3 In case δ > δ¯, there may still exist a sub-game perfect
equilibrium with the following properties:
• The government chooses to introduce an eco-label, and set the cri-
teria; r¯c = r¯∗c < r¯
∗
s.
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• Both firms adopt the eco-label.
Proof. See Appendix.
All though regulation is less stringent, the government may increase
the environmental benefit of regulation by introducing an eco-label since
both firms get ”regulated”. In addition an eco-label also reduces the
transport cost.
As long as δ ∈

0, δ¯

, global welfare is maximized with an eco-label.
This conjecture follows directly from the fact that the eco-label max-
imizes domestic welfare, and that poor country profit would be lower
with an environmental standard than with an eco-label. The eco-label
makes it possible for the foreign firm to commit to a cleaner production
process from which both the firm and the domestic consumers benefit.
6 Pure egoism
In order to explain that consumers are willing to pay more for green
products in spite of the fact that their individual choices do not influ-
ence the over all state of the environment, we have used the notion of
impure altruism taken from Andreoni[1]. However, some may reject the
assumption that consumers care for the foreign environment, especially if
the environmental problem is not transboundary. This can be captured
by the notion pure egoism, also taken from Andreoni[1]. If consumers
get utility from buying green in itself, but do not derive any utility from
the actual state of the foreign environment, we would have pure egoism
with respect to the foreign environment.
We then have that the foreign level of environmental damage, δef ,
should not be included in the welfare function. Since δe = δed+ δef , we
can rewrite the welfare functions in the two relevant cases.
For the environmental standard case we have:
w(r¯s) = s¯−
[m(r¯s)]
2 + [c(r¯s)]
2 −m(r¯s)c(r¯s)
36
+
5
6

m(r¯s)
2
− c(r¯s)

+δr¯sqd(r¯s) + δqf(r¯s),
and for an eco-label, given that m(r¯c)
2
≥ c(r¯c),
w(r¯c) = s¯ +
m(r¯c)
2
− c(r¯c) + δr¯c +
δ [1− r¯c]
2
.
We have added the correct expressions for, δef , for each case. The
new term reflects the fact that there is an environmental benefit of shift-
ing production abroad as long as the domestic consumers do not derive
utility from the actual state of the foreign environment.
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On the other hand, the warm glow term, m(r¯c)
2
, still influences demand
and thereby consumer surplus, and profits.
Denote the optimal environmental standard in case of pure egoism,
r¯∗pe, and denote the optimal eco-label criteria in this case, r¯
∗∗
pe .
By comparing the welfare expressions for the two policy choices, we
get the following proposition:
Proposition 4 In case of pure egoism, if m(r¯
∗
pe)
2
≥ c(r¯∗pe), it is optimal
for the government to introduce an eco-label and set the criterium, r¯∗∗pe.
Proof. In order to prove the proposition, it is suﬃcient to show that:
δr¯s +
δ [1− r¯c]
2
≥ δr¯sqd(r¯s) + δqf (r¯s)
⇔
r¯s + 1 ≥ 2r¯sqd(r¯s) + 2qf(r¯s)
⇔
r¯s [2qf (r¯s)− 1] ≥ 2qf(r¯s)− 1
Since m(r¯
∗
pe)
2
≥ c(r¯∗pe), we have 2qf(r¯s) − 1 < 0. Then, since r¯s ≤ 1, the
proposition must hold.
As long as m(r¯
∗
pe)
2
≥ c(r¯∗pe), an eco-label with criterium, r¯∗∗pe , actually
shifts some production, and hence pollution, to the foreign country.
Lastly, if the consumers neither get warm glow from consuming the
foreign product when the product has an eco-label, nor have any con-
cern for the foreign environment, the whole rationale behind eco-labels
based on production related criteria disappears. Firstly, it would not be
possible to get the foreign firm to adopt the eco-label since the eco-label
will not trigger a higher willingness to pay for the foreign product. Sec-
ondly, the government could do as well with an environmental standard
because when only the domestic firm adopts the eco-label, welfare is
independent of the policy instrument.
7 Vertical domination.
Our model can also be applied to situations in which products are poorly
diﬀerentiated from the beginning. As already mentioned, Neven and
Thisse [11] refer to this situation as vertical domination. In our model
vertical domination obtains when m(r) > 2.
With vertical domination we may have two Nash equilibria in pure
strategies in the second stage of the game. All the relevant ranges for
m(r) and c(r) are shown in the figure below:
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Figure 3
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The area C +D+E +F constitute the domain of the model in case
of vertical domination.
In the area D + E only one of the firms will adopt the eco-label.
Hence, there are two Nash-equilibria; one in which the domestic firm
adopts the eco-label, and the foreign firm does not, and one in which
the foreign firm adopts the eco-label, and the domestic firm does not.
However, due to the introduction of the eco-label, both firms will in-
crease their profit in both equilibria. Hence, foreign country welfare will
increase even if the foreign firm does not adopt the eco-label.
Note also that, in area D, the firm that adopts the eco-label will earn
more than the firm that does not adopt, while in area E, the firm that
adopts the eco-label will earn less than the firm that does not adopt!
Hence, it can happen that only the domestic firm adopts the eco-label,
but all the same, the foreign firm earn more than before and more than
the domestic firm.
We may also have combinations of m(r) and c(r) in which there is
an unique equilibrium in this stage of the game. That is, in Area C both
firms adopt the eco-label, while in Area F no firm adopts the eco-label.
When the domain of the functions, m(r) and c(r), fall into the area
D + E, and the Nash equilibrium implies that only one firm adopts
the eco-label, the government will in most cases do as well with an
environmental standard. If instead it had introduced an eco-label, it
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would have run the risk of the foreign firm being the only firm to adopt
the eco-label.
However, if m(r) and c(r) also fall into Area C, we may still have
that it is optimal for the domestic government to introduce an eco-label.
In this case the analysis follows the case for horizontal domination.
8 Discussion
Clearly, eco-labels only have a role as long as consumers are willing
to pay more for ”greener products”. There exists empirical evidence
directly suggesting that this, at least sometimes, is the case. Nearly all
tuna fish sold in the U.S. now have a ”dolphin safe” label. In order to
obtain the label the number of dolphins killed accidentally during a tuna
fish catch has to be below a certain limit set by the U.S. government. In
an empirical study Teisl, Roe & Hicks[16] find that the label has lead to
a significant increase in total tuna fish sales.
There is also a study from Denmark on actual shop purchases data by
Bjørner et al [3]. They find that the Nordic Swan label significantly in-
creases the marginal willingness to pay for two types of products, namely
detergent and toilet paper. They find no significant eﬀect on paper tow-
els, but according to the authors this could be due to the green consumer
rather choosing a reusable alternative to paper towels as dishcloth.
The paper further argues that eco-labels only have a role as long as
consumers have preferences for the global environment in one way or
the other. Thus, the critique that eco-labels are hidden protectionist
measures may be overstated. On the other hand, one could question
whether consumers really have preferences for the environment in other
countries. Many environmental bads are of course global of nature. This
not only goes for bads like global warming and decreasing biodiversity,
but also for industrial emissions of dangerous chemicals like dioxins etc.
which may accumulate in the food chain and turn up as a problem far
from the original source. However, the paper is also meant to cover typ-
ically local environmental problems like emissions of organic waste into
lakes etc. Consumers may have a willingness to pay for environmental
improvements outside the territory of their nation. They could be di-
rectly aﬀected in connection with for example holidays, and/or they may
express option- and existence values towards the environment far from
their home.
We have assumed throughout the paper that only the domestic gov-
ernment can inform the domestic consumers about the environmental
performance of products. Hence, firms do not have any incentive to do
abatement when left to themselves. As mentioned, one rational for this
assumption can be found in Rege [14]. There may also be other expla-
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nations for the relatively widespread use of eco-labels. Howarth et al.[7]
discusses the informational aspect of eco-labels. As long as the eco-label
is known to consumers, it serves as a simple sign of environmental supe-
riority. In the EU and in the Nordic countries the same eco-label is used
across many diﬀerent product categories. Hence, the use of eco-labels
likely have scale advantages, compared to the situation in which each
firm privately advertises the environmental performance of its products.
Another question is whether an environmental standard can trigger
an extra willingness to pay for a ”greener product” in the same way
as eco-labels. In principle there is nothing that precludes the domestic
government from publishing information regarding the environmental
regulation of its domestic firms. In Tietenberg [17] there is a discussion of
various kinds of disclosure strategies, among others the U.S. toxic release
inventory (TRI) where U.S based firms must report their emissions. We
can also think of other types of schemes, for example, a label stating
that ”this product is produced by a U.S. factory that is controlled and
found environmentally sound by the U.S. EPA”.
As it turns out, equilibria where consumers do not believe producers
to be regulated unless they see an eco-label, may not conflict with the
more basic assumption that consumers are rational, and should expect
that domestic firms are regulated as long as they in fact are regulated.
Suppose consumers do not believe producers to be regulated unless they
see an eco-label. An environmental standard will then not trigger an
extra willingness to pay for the products of the regulated firm. This
implies that domestic output and profit will be strictly decreasing in the
environmental standard, while foreign output and profit will be strictly
increasing.
For small values on the environmental damage parameter; δ, we may
then have that optimal policy is not to introduce an environmental stan-
dard. In this case consumer beliefs turn out to be self-fulfilling. At the
same time a positive criterium for an eco-label may still increase domes-
tic welfare. The main reason is the warm glow eﬀect which increases
the benefit of regulation. In addition domestic profit is not hampered
as is the case for an environmental standard. Thus, with such beliefs,
including the product category in an eco-label scheme may be the only
environmental policy instrument available.
In the paper eco-labels are not used for protectionists purposes. Some
empirical evidence suggest that the reverse is happening. Körber [9]
discusses the U.S. dolphin safe policy and the embargo of the Mexican
tuna fishing fleet. According to Körber the criteria for the dolphin safe
label has been set with protectionist purposes in mind. Among others
the criteria have been made increasingly stringent as the Mexican tuna
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fishing fleet has improved their dolphin records.
Further, regarding protectionism, Proposition 3 can be given an al-
ternative interpretation. Assume that the foreign firm has a technology
which only permits the firm to abate up to a certain level, apart from
that the firms are still symmetrical. In this case the government may be
able to reserve the eco-label for the domestic firm by setting the criteria
suﬃciently stringent. However, Proposition 3 tells us that this might not
be optimal. It could well be better for the domestic government to set a
less stringent criterium in order to get both firms to adopt the eco-label.
Hence, this paper does not generally support a policy where the
criteria is purposely chosen so that only a limited number of firms obtain
the eco-label. The environmental benefit of a scheme will be higher
the more widespread the eco-label is among the products in a category.
Further, consumers may incur a disutility from not buying their most
preferred product with respect to their other tastes because they want a
product with an eco-label. Clearly, a high adoption of eco-labels inside
a product category reduces this disutility.
Lastly, the paper suggests that none of the firms will loose compared
to the situation without any environmental policy when they both adopt
the eco-label. Thus, the domestic consumers pay for the abatement costs
of both firms. Here, the assumption about full coverage of the market
is crucial. When all consumers buy one unit independent of prices, the
price game allows both producers to raise their price with exactly the
same as the increase in marginal cost.
There are reasons to believe that the price increase for simple envi-
ronmental improvements will be modest, see for example Jaﬀe et al [8]
which suggests that abatement cost are in the range of 1% of product
prices. The assumption about full coverage of the market may then not
be too far from reality. In fact, if consumers with a high valuation of the
environment have stayed out of the market, we could have that market
size increased with eco-labels.
The paper also asserts that firms could gain even if they do not adopt
the eco-label. This is the case when products are poorly diﬀerentiated
from the beginning, and the willingness to pay for an eco-label is sig-
nificant. Hence, eco-labels may not be particularly threatening to the
welfare of exporting countries.
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A Demand in the two dimensional diﬀerentiation
case
We start by looking at the case in which only the domestic firm is reg-
ulated by an environmental standard. This case also corresponds to the
case in which only the domestic firm adopts the eco-label, given the same
stringency of regulation i.e. r¯s = r¯c.
A.1 Horizontal domination
The straight line,
λ∗x =
2
m(r¯s)
y +
pd − pf − 1
m(r¯s)
, r¯s > 0, (19)
divides the unit square into the market shares of firm d and f .
The demand function consists of three line segments. The first line
segment covers the case in which pd is so high that the line, (19), which
divides the unit square, do not cross the xaxes, that is, it only cuts of
the upper, left corner of the unit square. Demand is then given by the
following integral:
qd(pd, pf) = 1−
m(r¯s)−pd+pf+1
2]
0

2
m(r¯s)
y +
pd − pf − 1
m(r¯s)

dy
−(1− m(r¯s)− pd + pf + 1
2
),
for pd − pf − 1 ≥ 0 and
m(r¯s)− pd + pf + 1
2
≥ 0,
that is, all consumers to the right of, m(r¯s)−pd+pf+1
2
, on the line, buy
from firm f irrespectively of their λ, while consumers between, 0, and,
m(r¯s)−pd+pf+1
2
, may buy from either of the firms depending on their λ.
The second segment is the case shown in Figure 1. The line, (19),
then cuts of the unit square from the xaxes, but because: m(r¯s)−pd+pf+1
2
<
1, all consumers to the right of, m(r¯s)−pd+pf+1
2
, on the line, still buy from
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firm f irrespectively of their λ. For this intermediate case, demand is
given by the following integral:
qd(pd, pf) = 1−
m(r¯s)−pd+pf+1
2t]
pf−pd+1
2

2
m(r¯s)
y +
pd − pf − 1
m(r¯s)

dy
−(1− m(r¯s)− pd + pf + 1
2
),
for pd − pf − 1 < 0 and
m(r¯s)− pd + pf + 1
2
< 1
The last segment of the demand consists of those cases in which the
line, (19), cuts of the unit square from the xaxes, but only leaves the
bottom, right corner to firm f :
qd(pd, pf) = 1−
1]
pf−pd+1
2

2
m(r¯s)
y +
pd − pf − 1
m(r¯s)

dy,
for
pf − pd + 1
2
≤ 1 and m(r¯s)− pd + pf + 1
2
≥ 1
The three integrals can be solved, and we obtain the demand meeting
firm d:
qd(pd, pf ) =



(m(r¯s)−pd+pf+1)2
4m(r¯s)
for pf + 1 ≤ pd ≤ m(r¯s) + pf + 1
m(r¯s)−2(pd−pf−1)
4
for m(r¯s) + pf − 1 < pd < pf + 1
4m(r¯s)−(pf−pd−1)2
4m(r¯s)
for pf − 1 ≤ pd ≤ m(r¯s) + pf − 1
(20)
It is easy to check that the three expressions yield a continuous de-
mand function.
A.2 Vertical domination
In order to derive the demand functions in the vertical domination case
we also have to set up three integrals. However, it is only the interme-
diate case which diﬀers from the horizontal domination case. For the
intermediate case the line, (19), now divides the unit square from the
λaxes to the vertical line, x = 1.
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This intermediate integral in the vertical domination case can be
written:
qvd(pd, pf) = 1−
1]
0

2
m(r¯s)
y +
pd − pf − 1
m(r¯s)

dy,
for pf + 1 ≤ pd ≤ m(r¯s) + pf − 1.
The integral can be solved to yield the demand meeting firm 1 in
the vertical domination case. We can then write the demand function
as above:
qvd(pd, pf) =



(m(r¯s)−pd+pf+1)2
4m(r¯s)
for m(r¯s) + pf − 1 ≤ pd ≤ pf +m(r¯s) + 1
m(r¯s)−pd+pf
m(r¯s)
for pf + 1 < pd < m(r¯s) + pf − 1
4m(r¯s)−(pf−pd−1)2
4m(r¯s)
for pf − 1 ≤ pd ≤ pf + 1
(21)
It is easy to check that the three expressions give a continuous de-
mand function.
A.3 Both firms adopt the eco-label/no regulation
When either both firms adopt the eco-label, or none of the firms are
regulated, there is no vertical diﬀerentiation, and demand can be written:
qd(pd, pf) =
1− pd + pf
2
(22)
B Deriving the Nash-price equilibrium
B.1 Horizontal domination, environmental standard
As shown above, the demand function facing firm d is composed of three
segments of which we have chosen to focus on the intermediate, linear
segment where the following condition must be satisfied:
m(r¯s) + pf − 1 < pd < pf + 1. (23)
The domestic firm then solves the following problem:
max
pd,rd
πd = [pd − c0 − c(rd)]
2(pf − pd + 1) +m(r¯s)
4
, (24)
s.t.
rd ≥ r¯s.
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Since ∂πd∂rd < 0, we have that the domestic firm sets rd = r¯s.
For foreign profit we have:
max
pf ,rf
πf = [pf − c0 − c(rf)]
2(pd − pf + 1)−m(r¯s)
4
, (25)
s.t.
rf ≥ 0.
Since ∂πf∂rf < 0, we have that the foreign firm sets rf = 0.
From (24) and (25) we obtain two first order conditions which can
be solved to yield the Nash-equilibrium prices:
pd = c0 +
6 + 4c(r¯s) +m(r¯s)
6
, (26)
pf = c0 +
6 + 2c(r¯s)−m(r¯s)
6
. (27)
Since the demand functions are composed of three segments, we must
check if the Nash-price equilibrium candidate is consistent with the seg-
ment of demand that was used to derive the Nash-price equilibrium in
the first place. By inserting into (23) we get that the prices (26) and
(27) constitutes a Nash-equilibrium as long as:
m(r¯s) ≤ min

3− c(r¯s),
3 + c(r¯s)
2

(28)
It is not diﬃcult to find functional forms for m and c that satisfies
(28).3 As long as the Nash-equilibrium prices are consistent, we know
that the Nash price-equilibrium is unique (see Neven & Thisse [11]).
For the equilibrium output we have:
qd =
6− 2c(r¯s) +m(r¯s)
12
(29)
qf =
6 + 2c(r¯s)−m(r¯s)
12
(30)
It is then easy to obtain the reduced form profit functions:
πd =
1
2

6− 2c(r¯s) +m(r¯s)
6
2
(31)
and:
πf =
1
2

6 + 2c(r¯s)−m(r¯s)
6
2
(32)
Lastly, we obtain the profit and output of both firms when both or
none of the firms adopt the eco-label by setting c(r¯s) = 0 and m(r¯s) = 0
in the expressions (29), (30, (31) and (32).
3We have for example: m(r) =
√
r, c(r) = r2, r ∈ [0, 1].
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B.2 Vertical domination, environmental standard
In order to have vertical domination we must have, m(r¯s) > 2. As long
as the following condition is fulfilled:
pf + 1 < pd < m(r¯s) + pf − 1, (33)
we have that the domestic firm solves:
max
pd,rd
πd = [pd − c0 − c(rd)]
m(r¯s)− pd + pf
m(r¯s)
. (34)
s.t.
rd ≥ r¯s.
Since ∂πd∂rd < 0, we have that the domestic firm sets rd = r¯s.
For the foreign profit we have:
max
pf ,rf
πfπf = [pf − c0 − c(rf)]
pd − pf
m(r¯s)
. (35)
s.t.
rf ≥ 0.
Since ∂πf∂rf < 0, we have that the foreign firm sets rf = 0.
From (34) and (35) we obtain two first order conditions which can
be solved to yield the Nash-equilibrium prices:
pd = c0 +
2
3
[m(r¯s) + c(r¯s)] , (36)
pf = c0 +
1
3
[m(r¯s) + c(r¯s)] . (37)
By inserting (36) and (37) into (33), we see that the set of prices
constitutes a Nash equilibrium as long as:
m(r¯s) > max

3− c(r¯s),
3 + c(r¯s)
2

(38)
The conditions in (38) is then used to construct the domain of the
model. Note the similarity between the conditions in (38) and the con-
ditions in (28).
We have for the outputs:
qd =
2m(r¯s)− c(r¯s)
3m(r¯s)
,
qf =
m(r¯s) + c(r¯s)
3m(r¯s)
,
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from which we easily obtain the reduced form profit functions:
πd =
[2m(r¯s)− c(r¯s)]2
9m(r¯s)
, (39)
and:
πf =
[m(r¯s) + c(r¯s)]
2
9m(r¯s)
. (40)
which are used to deduce the diﬀerent equilibrium possibilities in the
second stage of the game.
For the case, r¯s = 0, or for the case, rd = rf = r¯s > 0, there is no
vertical diﬀerentiation, and we have that: πd = πf = 12 , as above.
C Deriving the ”transport cost”
C.1 Horizontal domination, environmental standard
When the price equilibrium is on the intermediate segments of demand,
we have that transport cost can be written:
TChds =
pf−pd+1
2]
0
y2dy +
m(r¯s)+pf−pd+1
2]
pf−pd+1
2
y2

1− 2
m(r¯s)
y − pd − pf − 1
m(r¯s)

dy
+
m(r¯s)+pf−pd+1
2]
pf−pd+1
2
[1− y]2

2
m(r¯s)
y +
pd − pf − 1
m(r¯s)

dy+
1]
m(r¯s)+pf−pd+1
2
[1− y]2 dy
The second and the third integral is weighted with the fraction of
consumer situated at x∗ ∈
k
pf−pd+1
2
,
m(r¯s)+pf−pd+1
2
l
buying from firm d
and firm f respectively. All consumers left of, pf−pd+1
2
, buy from firm
d independent of their λ, and all consumers right of, m(r¯s)+pf−pd+1
2
, buy
from firm f independent of their λ.
The integral can be solved to yield:
TChds =
1
3
− 1− [pf − pd]
2
4
− 3m(r¯s) [pd − pf ]− [m(r¯s)]
2
12
,
which by inserting for pf and pd yields:
TChds =
1 + [m(r¯s)]
2 + [c(r¯s)]
2 −m(r¯s)c(r¯s)
12
.
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Hence, we have:
TChds ≥
1
12
for ∀m(r¯s), c(r¯s) ∈ [0, 2]
We obtain the transport cost in the pure horizontal diﬀerentiation
case with identical costs by setting m(r¯s), c(r¯s) = 0.
Note that transport costs are minimized and equal to: 1
12
, when there
is no vertical diﬀerentiation, that is, either both firms have adopted the
eco-label or there is no regulation.
C.2 Vertical domination, environmental standard
When the price equilibrium is on the intermediate segments of demand,
we have that the transport cost can be written:
TCvds =
1]
0
y2

1− 2
m(r¯s)
y − pd − pf − 1
m(r¯s)

dy
+
1]
0
[1− y]2

2
m(r¯s)
y +
pd − pf − 1
m(r¯s)

dy.
The unit square is now divided so that even a consumer situated at 1
may buy from firm d if her λ is high enough, and vice versa, a consumer
situated at 0 may buy from firm f if her λ is low enough.
By inserting for pf and pd, the integral can be solved to yield:
TCvds =
m(r¯s)− 1
3m(r¯s)
.
And its derivative:
dTCvds
dr¯s
=
3m
9m2
> 0
i.e. the higher the, r¯s, the higher the transport cost because more buy
from firm d even if they are situated closer to firm f on the line.
D Deriving the ”warm glow”
D.1 Horizontal domination, environmental standard
When the price equilibrium is on the intermediate segment of the de-
mand function, we have that the ”warm glow” can be written:
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WGhds =
pf−pd+1
2]
0
1]
0
[λm(r¯s)] dλdy +
m(r¯s)+pf−pd+1
2]
pf−pd+1
2
1]
2y+pd−pf−1
m(r¯s)
[λm(r¯s)] dλdy
With respect to the first integral, we have that all consumers left of,
pf−pd+1
2
, buy from firm d independent of their λ. While for the second
integral, only consumers with a λ ∈
k
2y+pd−pf−1
m(r¯s)
, 1
l
buy from firm d.
Lastly, no consumer to the right of, m(r¯s)+pf−pd+1
2
, buy from firm d.
The integral can be solved to yield:
WGhds ==

pf − pd + 1
2

m(r¯s)
2
+
(m(r¯s))
2
6
,
which by inserting for pf and pd yields:
WGhds =
m(r¯s)
4

1 +
(m(r¯s)− c(r¯s)
3

.
D.2 Vertical domination, environmental standard
When the price equilibrium is on the intermediate segments of demand,
we have that the ”warm glow” can be written:
WGvds =
1]
0
1]
2y+pd−pf−1
m(r¯s)
[λm(r¯s)] dλdy
The unit square is now divided so that even a consumer situated at 1
may buy from firm d if her λ is high enough, and vice versa, a consumer
situated at 0 may buy from firm f if her λ is low enough.
The integral can be solved to yield:
WGvds =
m(r¯s)
2
− 1
12m(r¯s)
[1 + pd − pf ]3 +
1
12m(r¯s)
[pd − pf − 1]3 .
which by inserting for pf and pd yields:
WGvds =
m(r¯s)
2
− 1
12m(r¯s)
%
1 +
m(r¯s) + c(r¯s)
3
3
−

m(r¯s) + c(r¯s)
3
− 1
3&
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D.3 Both firms adopt the eco-label
In this case all consumers buy eco-labeled products, that is, we have:
WGc =
1]
0
1]
0
[λm(r¯s)] dλdy =
m(r¯s)
2
.
E Proof of Observation in Section 3
The expression for welfare in case, δ = 0, is:
ws(r¯s) = s¯−
[m(r¯s)]
2 + [c(r¯s)]
2 −m(r¯s)c(r¯s)
36
+
5
6

m(r¯s)
2
− c(r¯s)

We assume an interior solution i.e. r¯∗s > 0, hence, the second term
above must be negative. Thus, we see that in order for r¯∗s > 0 to be
optimal, we have to have m(r¯
∗
s )
2
> c(r¯∗s).
F Proof of Proposition 4
In order to prove the Proposition it is enough to show that it holds for
at least one example.
Assume that:
s¯ = s− c0 − δ −
7
12
= 2− 7
12
for δ = 3
Let further m(r) and c(r) be given:
m(r) =
√
r, c(r) = r2 for r ∈ [0, 1]
Domestic welfare in case of an environmental standard can then be
expressed:
w = 2− 7
12
− r + r
4 − r 52
36
+
5
6
√
r
2
− r2

+ 3r

6− 2r2 +
√
r
12

,
where r = r¯s.
And in case of an eco-label:
w = 2− 7
12
+

3r +
√
r
2
− r2

.
For the adoption constraint we have:
√
r
2
≥ r2 ⇔ r ≤ 3
u
1
4
(≈ 0, 63).
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We can then plot the welfare expressions:
Figure 4.
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
r
The vertical, dotted line is the adoption constraint. The black line is
welfare in case of an eco-label, while the grey line is welfare in case of an
environmental standard. The internal welfare optimum in the latter case
obtains when r¯s ≈ 0, 7, and hence, δ > δ¯. However, we see that welfare
with an eco-label is higher even though the optimal criteria is r¯c ≈ 0, 63,
that is, the welfare maximization for an eco-label is constrained.
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